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Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems 
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a TEAM, CNRS and University Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris, France 
b GATE, CNRS and University Lumière Lyon 2, Lyon, France 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team composition influences both the 
contract offer of employers and employee performance when a revenue-sharing scheme is 
introduced. Experimental evidence shows that the principal ceases trying to monitor her team 
through a contract offer when agents vary in their ability. In this case, agents focus more heavily 
on their teammate's behaviour than on the principal's offer and therefore, regardless of the level 
of team-based compensation, a large amount of free-riding occurs within the team. In contrast, 
when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to use the contract offer as a coordination 
device among themselves and therefore achieve higher efficiency. 
 
JEL classification: J33, C91, C92, D63 
Keywords: Experiments, Free-Riding, Compensation, Peer Pressure, Teamwork. 
 
 
L'hétérogénéité des équipes est-elle compatible avec une rémunération collective? 
 
Résumé : 
 
Cet article rend  compte d'une expérience sur la manière dont la composition d'une équipe influence à la 
fois la conception du contrat par le principal et la performance des salariés lorsque l'on introduit une 
rémunération de groupe de type partage du profit. Les résultats indiquent que le principal renonce à 
essayer de monitorer son équipe à travers son offre contractuelle lorsque les agents n'ont pas tous la 
même habileté. Dans ce cas, les agents se focalisent bien plus sur le comportement de leur co-équipier 
que sur l'offre du principal. Dès lors, quel que soit le mode de partage entre le principal et l'équipe, le 
free-riding se développe massivement au sein de l'équipe. Par contre, quand l'équipe est homogène, les 
agents parviennent davantage à utiliser l'offre contractuelle comme dispositif de coordination entre eux et 
parviennent ainsi à  coopérer plus souvent et à atteindre un meilleur niveau d'efficience.  
 
Mots clés : Expérimentation, Passager clandestin, Compensation, Pression des pairs, 
Travail en équipe. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms' performance and team-based compensation would appear to be contradictory 
parameters. A moral hazard problem (the "1/n problem") arises in teams where a 
dominant strategy for each agent consists of free-riding on the effort of other agents 
(Holmström, 1982). In teams where residual returns are equally shared, the concern for 
cost control wanes and agents are incited to exert less effort. This problem tends to 
increase with the size of the partnership, since as the number of partners sharing the 
revenue rises, the individual reward from additional effort declines. 
An empirical assessment of the efficiency of team-based compensation was initially 
investigated within professional partnerships where contracts are observable, such as 
legal partnerships (Leibowitz and Tollison, 1980) or medical group practices 
(Newhouse, 1973; Gaynor and Pauly, 1990; Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer, 1997). 
These studies have revealed the importance of free-riding and shirking in teams where 
residual returns are equally shared. Group incentives without goal-setting fail to 
increase team productivity (Weiss, 1987). As a consequence, an empirical assessment of 
the impact of non-productivity-based group incentives usually concludes that such 
incentives fail to increase firms' performance (Erev, Bornstein and Galili, 1993; 
Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997), whereas individual piece-rate pay does play a role in 
improving performance (Booth and Franck, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Prendergast, 1999). 
However, studies of profit sharing programs and Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
have shown that firms which practise as well as adopt profit-sharing plans benefit from 
productivity differentials, as compared to firms which do not introduce such schemes 
(see the survey conducted by Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). The incentive to free-ride, 
induced by group compensation, can be offset by factors such as repetition of the game, 
interaction effects among human resource management policies (Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi, 1997), and peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Cross-section estimates 
(Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987) and experimental evidence on teams (Carpenter, 1999) have 
shown how group rewards can favour horizontal monitoring and mutual assistance, 
hence cooperation in instances where individual effort is not observable except by co-
workers. A final source of increased effort induced by group rewards lies in reciprocity 
considerations (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 1998), in 
particular between a fair principal and reciprocating team members (Güth and Alii, 
1999; Rossi and Warglien, 1999; Meidinger, Rullière and Villeval, 2001). Yet, it should 
be noted that empirical studies also suggest that introducing group compensation leads 
to less productive employees improving their effort, while more productive employees 
do not alter their contribution (Weiss, 1987; Hansen, 1997). Similarly, a real-effort 
experiment performed on contests indicates that less-capable agents expend a high level 
of effort despite their smaller chances of winning the contest, driving up the effort of 
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others (van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001). This finding could reveal that 
individuals, depending on both their ability and the incentive structure, do not respond 
in the same manner to team-based compensation. Thus, the efficiency of group 
incentives may be influenced not only as team size increases, but also when worker 
ability varies (Prendergast, 1999). 
This paper is aimed at examining whether or not heterogeneity in a team's ability 
hinders the efficiency of team-based compensation (e.g. revenue-sharing). It is intended 
to identify both the influence of team composition on the design of a group incentive 
contract by the principal and the impact of such an offer on team cooperation. 
Empirical investigation was conducted in an experimental setting. This methodological 
choice has been motivated by three elements. First, imposing exogenous team-based 
compensation on all subjects enables circumventing the selection bias problem that 
affects the results of certain empirical tests on incentive provision. Second, it allows 
directly observing individual behaviour in the presence of changes in controlled 
environmental parameters, while limiting the risk associated with uncontrolled omitted 
variables and the use of proxies. Lastly, it serves to distinguish between monetary 
aspects and peer pressure in motivating individual behaviour. 
The experiment focuses on a game played with three players (one principal and two 
agents). The principal designs a contract by deciding on her share of the outcome and 
the agents decide, non-cooperatively, whether to accept or reject the contract and then 
on the extent of their individual effort. In the so-called symmetric treatment, both agents 
have the same level of productivity, whereas in the asymmetric treatment, one agent's 
productivity is twice that of his teammate. 
Experimental evidence indicates that when agents vary in ability, team-based 
compensation gives rise to much more free-riding. Heterogeneous teams display low 
rates of cooperation because principals refrain from monitoring teams through contract 
design and agents focus more heavily on their teammates' behaviour rather than on the 
principal's offers. In contrast, when teams exhibit homogeneous abilities, agents utilise 
contract offers as a coordination device and a higher rate of cooperation results when 
they are offered a greater share of the outcome. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the principal 
multi-agent game, the layout of the two types of treatment (symmetric and asymmetric) 
and theoretical predictions. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Section 4 
discusses the experimental data and comments on the econometric results. The final 
section summarises the results and provides concluding remarks. 
2. The principal-team game 
2.1 Basic structure of the game 
The game involves three players: a principal (subject X ) and a team of two agents 
(subjects Y1  and Y2 ), required to share a pie whose size depends on their decisions. Let 
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us define ri  and ei  as player Yi 's productivity and effort level ( { }2,1Îi ), respectively. 
Without any complementarity in the agents' effort, the resulting outcome is 
py p e e= +( )r r1 1 2 2 , with p being the price of output. This outcome is to be divided 
according to a sharing scheme designed by the principal; such a scheme is characterised 
by both a parameter q  (that determines the principal's share) and a team payment 
formula (that determines the allocation of ( )1-q py  among the agents). This payment 
formula entails a revenue-sharing mechanism that distributes an equal share of the 
outcome to each agent regardless of his productivity level. The adoption of such 
equality in sharing is in fact more likely in small groups (Encinosa, Gaynor and 
Rebitzer, 1997). Moreover, a collective possession of talent acts in support of this type 
of scheme since agents are not considered as being responsible for their productivity 
level but only for their effort level (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1999). The outcome is 
thus shared by allocating qpy  to the principal and 2/)1( pyq-  to each agent. 
The agents' payoffs are determined by subtracting an individual cost of effort from their 
share. The corresponding cost function is the same for both agents: 
 
C e
e
ai
i( ) =
2
,  with a > 0 
At the beginning of the game (during Stage 1), the principal designs a contract and 
makes a "take it or leave it" offer to the agents, by specifying a value for the share 
parameter q  of either 0.5 or 0.33. These share values correspond to an equal share 
based on balanced weighting either between the team and the principal or between the 
members of the triad (leaving aside the cost of efforts borne by the agents alone). 
During Stage 2, both agents, informed of the principal's offer, decide simultaneously 
whether to accept or reject the offer. If at least one agent rejects the offer, the current 
round is over and the payoff is zero for all three subjects. If both agents accept the offer, 
each decides non-cooperatively on his level of effort, with ei ³ 0 . These decisions then 
determine the outcome to be shared: py p e e= +( )r r1 1 2 2 . 
2.2 Symmetric and asymmetric treatment of the game 
With parameter values p=12 and a=4, two types of treatment have been conducted: a 
symmetric treatment and an asymmetric treatment. According to the symmetric 
treatment, both agents exhibit the same productivity ( )121 == rr  and each must 
choose a level of effort equal to either 6 or 14. In the asymmetric treatment, the 
productivity of agent Y2  is twice that of agent Y1  ( 11 =r  and 22 =r ) and each must 
choose a level of effort equal to either 12 or 22. Tables 1-4 show the agents' and 
principal's payoffs for both types of treatment. 
[Insert Tables 1-4 about here] 
As shown in these tables, it is clear that a "prisoner's dilemma" is encountered for the 
team in both types of treatment and for each value of q. Once q has been given, in a 
symmetric as well as an asymmetric treatment, each agent displays a strictly dominant 
strategy that consists of choosing his low level of effort. For this reason, the choice of 
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such a level is called the "free-riding strategy" and the choice of a high level of effort is 
the "cooperation strategy".  
2.3 Theoretical predictions 
Since alternative payment levels have been normalised to zero, the participation 
constraint of agents' non-negative payoff is satisfied by any principal offer. In a one-
shot game, for both types of treatment and with each agent playing his free-riding 
strategy, the principal should offer a 0.50 contract. Neither agent Y1  nor Y2  has any 
incentive to reject such an offer, hence the principal can obtain a better payoff with a 
0.50 contract than with a 0.33 contract: the payoff will be 72 (instead of 48) in the 
symmetric treatment and 216 (instead of 144) in the asymmetric treatment. 
Conditions however could be different in a repeated game without reshuffling. 
Notwithstanding the traditional backward-induction argument, players in such a game 
could seek coordination on a better issue. In the two types of treatment, through the 
costly rejection of a 0.50 contract in a given round, both agents can individually 
motivate the principal to offer them a better contract in the subsequent rounds. A better 
contract would provide the agents with the opportunity to coordinate on the cooperation 
issue. For both types of treatment, as shown in Table 5 below, it is clear that 
coordination on the cooperation issue with a 0.33 contract makes all parties better off 
than when agents coordinate on the free-riding issue with a 0.50 contract. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We are seeking to investigate the comparative efficiency of such coordination in both 
types of treatment. In asymmetric treatment, due to differences in ability, the incentive 
to free-ride varies from one agent to the next. When teamed with a partner who 
cooperates, the less-productive agent exhibits the greatest incentive to free-ride2. In 
contrast, in symmetric treatment, both agents have the same incentive to free-ride. 
3. Experimental design 
The experiment was performed at GATE, using the Regate software. Six 20-period 
sessions were run. 72 participants were drawn from the undergraduate classes of the 
Engineering and Textile School of Lyon; no subject was introduced into such 
experiment. 24 groups were formed in all, 12 each playing the symmetric treatment and 
asymmetric treatment. Group assignments were randomly organised at the beginning of 
the session. In order to study how subjects learn to cooperate over time within a triad, a 
partner-matching protocol was employed so that each participant could interact with the 
same two other participants throughout a session. All interactions between participants 
                                                 
2 Weiss (1987) and Hansen (1997) consider that the most capable employees are less motivated by group 
incentives and should be more inclined to free-ride, because they need higher reward to increase their 
contribution following the introduction of team-based compensation. Here, we do not consider the effect 
of a change in the mode of compensation. In contrast therefore, less-capable agents have a stronger 
incentive to free-ride on the high productivity of their partners. For the same reason, Farell and Scotchmer 
(1988) show that in partnerships, the most capable agents try to constitute homogeneous teams to reject 
the low-ability employees. 
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remained anonymous. A session lasted 45 minutes on average, not counting the time 
needed to answer a post-experiment questionnaire and to pay participants. All 
transactions were conducted in ECU (Experimental Currency Units), with the ECU-
French franc conversion rate set at 100 ECU = 5 FF for symmetric treatment and 100 
ECU = 2.5 FF for asymmetric (in order to obtain comparable average payments of 
subjects for both types of treatment). At the end of the session, each subject was paid (in 
FF) the sum of his payoffs obtained during the 20 periods. A show-up fee of 15 FF was 
added to the total. 
At the beginning of a session, participants were handed a copy of the instructions as the 
experimenter read them aloud (see Appendices A and B). Productivity levels and payoff 
functions, with respect to the share parameter, and the selected efforts were made 
common knowledge. Questions were answered privately by the experimenter. Each 
subject was then randomly assigned by the computer the role of either principal (subject 
X) or agent in the symmetric treatment, and either a low-productivity agent (subject Y1) 
or high-productivity agent (subject Y2) in the asymmetric treatment. In the asymmetric 
treatment, each principal was matched during each period with the same two 
heterogeneous agents. Each participant kept the same role throughout the session. 
At the beginning of each period, subject X makes an offer regarding the share of the 
future outcome. Agents Y1 and Y2 are informed of this offer and decide simultaneously 
and without any communication between themselves whether or not to accept it. If both 
agents decide to accept the offer, they select their own level of effort. 
As regards information feedback at the end of each period, subjects were informed of: 
the acceptance decision, individual choices of effort levels, and each group member's 
payoff, in recognition of the fact that in firms, employees are usually able to observe the 
efforts of co-workers. The principal was given the same feedback, since Weiss (1987) 
and Hansen (1997) have provided examples of firms in which employers elect to pay 
employees according to the team outcome, despite the possibility of observing 
individual contributions. 
Participants could see on the upper half of their computer screen a table displaying their 
cumulative decisions and the group's results in all of the session's preceding rounds. 
4. Experimental evidence 
This section presents a discussion of the overall statistics, the principal's behaviour, and 
the various aspects of team and individual behaviour with respect to contract acceptance 
and cooperation. 
4.1 General results 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 6, a large majority of contracts (87.70%) are accepted. Among these 
421 contracts, 25.65% induce team cooperation, 38.72% team free-riding and 35.63% 
partial team cooperation. 
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In both types of treatment, the majority of contracts offered are 0.33 contracts (83.33% 
in symmetric treatment and 74.58% in asymmetric treatment); such a breakdown in 
offers favours team cooperation. In symmetric treatment, a 0.50 contract induces 6.6% 
team cooperation and 73.4% team free-riding, whereas a 0.33 contract induces 39.9% 
team cooperation and 19.2% team free-riding. In asymmetric treatment, a 0.50 contract 
induces 5.89% team cooperation and 70.58% team free-riding, while a 0.33 contract 
induces 14.94% team cooperation and 51.72% team free-riding. These results have been 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The differing impact of the principal's offer on team cooperation between the two types 
of treatment has also been documented in Tables 7 and 8 below, which display the 
various issues played by the team for an accepted contract. The data clearly reveal that a 
0.33 contract incites much more team cooperation in symmetric than in asymmetric 
treatment. 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
Focus must therefore be placed both on the determinants of group behaviour, with 
respect to the type of treatment, and on the determinants of individual behaviour within 
groups of the principal and agents. 
4.2 Principal's behaviour 
The majority of principals offer 0.33 contracts. Yet it should be pointed out that the 
frequency of these offers is greater in symmetric (83.33%) than in asymmetric treatment 
(74.58%). A 2c  test (5.526) on these data leads to accepting the hypothesis of a 
difference between types of treatment (at a level of 2%). A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test concludes that a principal offers a significantly greater number of 0.33 contracts in 
symmetric rather than asymmetric treatment. However, given the same principal 
behaviour in both types of treatment, such a difference may obviously also be attributed 
to differences in team behaviour. 
A data panel analysis has been conducted in order to identify the determinants of the 
principal's behaviour and to test the hypothesis of a difference in behaviour between the 
two types of treatment. Repeated observations (20) on the same units (24 groups) are 
available and we can choose between treating individual (group) effects as either fixed 
or random effects. Fixed effects would be appropriate if the groups in the sample could 
not be considered as randomly-drawn from some underlying population. Because 
groups have been randomly constituted from a sample of heterogeneous individuals and 
because the specific value of some fixed group effects lie beyond the scope of this 
study, random effects were chosen. This random-effect approach also allows for 
deriving estimations independent of the values of fixed effects and for making 
inferences with respect to population characteristics. The following variables have been 
considered: 
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share = 1 if the principal's share is 0.33, and = 0 if the share is 0.50, 
accept_1 = 1 if the contract was accepted in the preceding round, and = 0 otherwise, 
teamfr_1 = 1 if the team free-rode in the preceding round, and = 0 otherwise, 
round = 1-20 for the ranking of interactions within groups, 
where i denotes the group number and t the round number. 
Separate Probit regressions with random effects were run in accordance with the 
following model: 
prob share f Z( ) ( )= , with Z being a latent variable defined by the following equation: 
Zit = b b b b1 2 3 41 1 1+ + +accept accept teamfr round_ ( _ )( _ ) '  + +( )vi ite  
with vi it+ e  an error term consisting of two components: a time-invariant group-
specific component, and a remainder component assumed to be uncorrelated over time. 
In both of these regressions, the proportion of total variance contributed by the panel-
level variance is significantly different from zero. Tables 9 and 10 show the regression 
results. 
[Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here] 
It appears that the principal's behaviour differs from one type of treatment to the next. In 
asymmetric treatment, the principal's offers do not depend on the team behaviour during 
the previous round, whereas this behaviour is highly significant in symmetric treatment. 
Moreover, in symmetric treatment, the acceptance of contracts exerts a significantly 
positive effect on a 0.33 offer, while team free-riding has a negative influence. Table 11 
below presents the predicted probabilities of a 0.33 offer for both types of treatment and 
as a function of team behaviour during the previous round. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Such a difference in the principal's behaviour between types of treatment could 
naturally be attributed to principals' expectations that team cooperation through a 0.33 
contract is much more likely in a symmetric rather than asymmetric team. In symmetric 
treatment, the advantage of team cooperation and the incentives to free-ride are similar 
for both agents, a situation that could favour team cooperation. In contrast, in 
asymmetric treatment, because of the difference in agents' productivity, incentives to 
free-ride are much stronger for the first agent than for the second, which could introduce 
greater conflict between agents and dissuade principals from attempting to monitor team 
behaviour through the type of contract offered. 
This difference in behaviour may also, in part, be attributed to the different structure of 
the principal's financial incentives from one type of treatment to the next. In comparing 
the principal's payoff obtained for a 0.33 contract with team cooperation to that obtained 
for a 0.50 contract with team free-riding, the financial incentive to induce team 
cooperation through a 0.33 contract is greater (55.5%) in symmetric treatment than in 
asymmetric (22.2%). 
In symmetric treatment, not surprisingly, team free-riding has a negative impact on 0.33 
contract offers, which could suggest that principals are willing to punish agents by 
keeping a greater share for themselves in the following round whenever the team free-
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rides. A more striking feature here perhaps is the positive influence of contract 
acceptance on the principal's offer. A contract accepted in the previous round does not 
incite principals to offer a 0.50 contract during the following round, in spite of the 
incurred risk in the case of team free-riding with 0.33 contracts; team free-riding 
confronts the principals with the risk of a 33% decrease in their payoff when comparing 
0.33 and 0.50 contracts. Yet, the risk of greater loss in the case of a 0.50 contract's 
rejection, coupled with the principal's fear of such rejection, can also provide an 
explanation for the positive effect of acceptance on subsequent offers. 
4.3 Contract acceptance by the team 
Although all contracts satisfy the participation constraint, some do get rejected (11.25% 
in symmetric treatment and 13.33% in asymmetric treatment). A Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test allows accepting the null hypothesis of no difference in rejection rates 
between types of treatment (p < 0.2981). 
As displayed in Figure 2 however, a huge difference in rejection rates as a function of 
the principal's offer is apparent. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The rejection of 0.50 contracts can indeed be interpreted as punishment aimed at 
monitoring the principal: 25.8% of the teams that rejected a contract in the previous 
round reject it again during the next round in asymmetric treatment and 34.46% do the 
same in symmetric treatment, despite the cost such a rejection entails. The rejection of 
0.33 contracts could be considered as mistakes since the principal cannot offer a better 
share (only 1% of the 0.33 contracts are rejected in symmetric treatment and 2.8% in 
asymmetric). Yet in spite of these low rejection rates, such behaviour could also be 
interpreted as a monitoring device used by an agent to induce his partner to cooperate. 
Let us first consider the team's attempts to monitor the principal through contract 
acceptance and rejection. A panel data analysis with random effects is used to generate 
additional information on agents' acceptance behaviour. Because the level of variability 
in the team acceptance variable is not sufficient to allow separating regressions by type 
of treatment, the 480 observations were pooled and a dummy variable was included in 
the regression in order to identify a possible treatment-correlated difference. 
By setting the variable accept = 1 if the contract is accepted by the team and = 0 
otherwise, and setting the treatment dummy variable = 1 for asymmetric treatment and 
= 0 for symmetric treatment, the two following Probit regressions were run to identify 
the determinants of acceptance probability (prob(accept)). 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
A likelihood ratio test shows that the proportion of total variance contributed by the 
panel-level variance component is significantly different from zero. It should be noted 
that the treatment variable is not significant, whereas the principal's offer and round 
number are. Not surprisingly then, a 0.33 contract offer increases acceptance probability 
and the positive round effect reveals that the probability of accepting an offer rises over 
time. 
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Regression 2 yields Figure 3, which interestingly suggests that the round effect is 
mainly concentrated on the 0.50 offers. As the repeated experiment progresses, teams 
are increasingly inclined to accept such offers, most likely because of the cumulative 
cost of multiple rejection. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
It is also clear however that in order to fully understand teams' contract rejection, 
individual behaviour needs to be examined more closely. Let us now consider 
individuals' attempts to monitor co-workers within the team. A contract is rejected as 
soon as one agent declines the offer. Since the treatment variable is not significant in 
explaining team acceptance, the 480 observations were pooled and the regressions 
assumed a common behaviour for both agents. We are therefore considering that 
individual acceptance probability depends on: the contract proposed during the current 
round (share), the partner's cooperation in the preceding round (Y_icoop_1 = 1 if the 
partner cooperated), the round number, and the treatment (to ensure the insignificance 
of the dummy variable). Table 13 below shows the results of a Probit regression with 
random effects. 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
It once again appears that no significant difference is present between the two types of 
treatment, whereas the principal's offer and round number are significant. Of particular 
relevance here is the insignificance of the partner's previous choice, which may indicate 
that contract rejection is not used as a peer pressure mechanism to induce partner 
cooperation. 
4.4 Team cooperation 
As shown in Table 6, team behaviour seems to be influenced both by the principal's 
contract offer and by the type of treatment. Generally speaking (see the two following 
Probit regressions with teamcoop = 1 if both agents cooperate and = 0 otherwise), team 
cooperation does depend both on the principal's offer (a 0.33 contract offer exerts a 
positive effect on the probability of team cooperation) and on the type of treatment 
(symmetric treatment favours team cooperation). The round number, in contrast, is not 
correlated with team cooperation. 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
The treatment effect however is being investigated herein through a dummy variable, 
which assumes that such an effect can only be accounted for through a difference in the 
constant term of the latent variable equation. Thus, Probit regressions have also been 
separately run for each type of treatment in order to obtain more information on 
differences between the two (see Table 15 below). 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
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It should be noted that the non significant effect of round number obtained in the overall 
sample results in fact from two opposing and counterbalancing effects related to the 
type of treatment: the round effect is positive in asymmetric treatment and negative in 
symmetric treatment, as displayed in the following figures. 
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
In addition, and perhaps of even greater pertinence, the principal's offer (while 
favouring team cooperation in symmetric treatment) has no significant impact in 
asymmetric treatment. This finding potentially suggests that in asymmetric treatment, 
the individual cooperation of each agent is much more heavily incited by the behaviour 
of the team partner in the preceding round rather than by what the principal offered. 
This suggestion requires further investigation of individual behaviour in each type of 
treatment. 
 
4.5 Individual cooperation 
Testing the hypothesis that the asymmetry of agents leads them to focus more heavily 
on the partner's behaviour than on the principal's offer can be investigated by 
introducing both the principal's offer and the partner's previous choice into the Probit 
regressions. In both types of treatment, with a common behaviour assumed for agents 
Y1 and Y2 , we have considered that an agent's cooperation probability depends on: the 
current contract (share), the partner's choice in the preceding round (Y_icoop_1 = 1 if 
the partner cooperated), and the round number. Table 16 presents the results obtained 
for both types of treatment. 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
Whereas in symmetric treatment the variables share and Y_icoop_1 are both significant, 
only Y_icoop_1 is significant in asymmetric treatment. For asymmetric treatment 
therefore, both agents are much more preoccupied by how the partner behaved in the 
preceding round than by the principal's current offer. From the results of Regression 2, 
an agent cooperates with a probability of 0.1978 if the partner free-rode in the previous 
round and with a probability of 0.4406 if he cooperated. 
It must be noted at this juncture that if the assumption of common agent behaviour in 
symmetric treatment seems justified due to the same incentive to free-ride, such an 
assumption might not necessarily be justified in asymmetric treatment. Assuming that 
the partner cooperates, free-riding then provides each agent with the percentage increase 
in payoff shown in Table 17. In asymmetric treatment therefore, the less-able agent Y1 
has greater incentive to free-ride than the more-able agent Y2 . 
[Insert Table 17 about here] 
To test the hypothesis that both agents display common behaviour in asymmetric 
treatment, despite the incentive differences, we have included a dummy variable 
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(dummy = 1 for agent 1Y ) for this treatment and run a Probit regression with random 
effects on the following variables: 
[Insert Table 18 about here] 
From the above table, it is clear that, despite incentive differences between agents, no 
significant difference in agent behaviour can be detected. For both agents, the only truly 
significant variable therefore is the partner's choice in the preceding round. 
4.6 On the future of team cooperation 
It is obviously difficult to extrapolate what was observed over 20 rounds to what may 
have transpired had the number of rounds been increased considerably. A closer look at 
the evolution in team cooperation rates over the rounds is perhaps instructive. Table 19 
below shows the rates of both team cooperation and the 0.33 contract offers over the 
first five and last five rounds. 
[Insert Table 19 about here] 
In symmetric treatment, as partially revealed by this table, a steady decrease in team 
cooperation occurs in spite of a high level of 0.33 contract offers. In regressing over the 
20 rounds the rate of team cooperation on the round number, the following equation is 
derived (with P>|t| in parentheses): 
rate of team coop = - 0.008 round + 0.458 
(0.034) (0.000) 
This expression is basically in agreement with the decrease in predicted probability of 
cooperation for both agents over the rounds (see Table 16). This declining probability 
over time in symmetric treatment is consistent with behaviour observed in the one-shot 
and finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma (Cooper, DeJong and Forsythe, 1996) as well 
as in the sequential prisoner's dilemma (Clark and Sefton, 2001). 
In asymmetric treatment, apart from a pronounced end-game effect for team cooperation 
by the 20th round, an increase in team cooperation rate over time is roughly visible. 
Running a similar regression as for symmetric treatment, the following expression is 
obtained (with P>|t| in parentheses): 
rate of team coop = 0.0118 round 
(0.000) 
This result is in basic agreement with the increase in predicted probability of team 
cooperation over the rounds (see Table 15). This rising probability over time in 
asymmetric treatment could simply suggest that learning cooperative behaviour takes 
more time when agents vary in their ability. This assumption is consistent with Hansen 
(1997), who showed that introducing a group incentive plan immediately gives rise to 
free-riding, whereas its positive impact on effort is delayed by several months. 
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This divergent evolution (which partly reflects the divergent evolution of team 
cooperation probabilities obtained in the panel analysis) should perhaps be kept in mind 
before concluding that symmetric treatment will always lead to greater efficiency. It is 
possible to estimate the efficiency of both types of treatment by comparing the average 
total group earnings obtained in each treatment to that which could have been obtained 
by moving from free-riding in a 0.50 contract to cooperation in a 0.33 contract. The 
potential gain from such a move is (550-360) = 190 in asymmetric treatment and (238-
126) = 112 in symmetric treatment. With an average total group earnings of 361.79 in 
asymmetric treatment and 168.76 in symmetric treatment, the efficiency of asymmetric 
treatment is only equal to (361.79-360)/190 = 0.0094, while that of symmetric treatment 
is (168.76-126)/112 = 0.3817. 
5. Conclusion 
Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when workers vary in their 
ability ? Facing a team of two agents with either similar (symmetric treatment) or 
different abilities (asymmetric treatment), a principal usually offers a 0.33 contract 
although she could keep half of the outcome for herself (i.e. a 0.5 contract). In both 
treatments, this choice is motivated by the fear of a contract rejection by the agents. As 
a matter of fact, such a rejection is a means by which agents can punish the principal for 
not offering a more advantageous contract. In a homogeneous team, a 0.33 contract is 
also designed to encourage the team members to cooperate instead of free-ride. In 
contrast, this objective is expected to be more difficult to reach when the agents vary in 
their ability; therefore, the principal ceases trying to monitor her heterogeneous team 
through contract offer. 
Once the contract has been accepted, though this principal multi-agent relationship is 
triadic most agents behave as if they were involved in a bilateral relationship. In 
heterogeneous team, agents focus more heavily on their teammate’s behaviour than on 
the principal’s offer. In this case, regardless of the level of team-based compensation, 
agents reveal to be unable to coordinate and therefore a large amount of free-riding 
occurs within the team. In contrast, agents in homogeneous team are better able to use 
the contract offer as a coordination device among themselves to achieve higher 
efficiency. However, the future of cooperation remains an open question since the 
probability of team cooperation increases over time in asymmetric treatment, while 
decreasing in symmetric treatment. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the symmetric treatment 
 
You will be participating in an economics experiment in which you can earn money. The 
amount of your earnings will depend not only on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the 
other participants. 
 
This session consists of 20 periods. During each period, a subject X interacts with two subjects 
Y1 and Y2. You will be assigned one of these three roles (either X, Y1 or Y2) at random. You 
will keep the same role and interact with the same two other partic ipants throughout these 20 
periods. You will never be informed of the identity of these participants. 
 
Roles 
q Subjects Y1 and Y2 are, as a team, to compose a pie, which will be shared among the three 
subjects; the amount of this pie is given in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). 
 
q Subject X has to propose to Y1 and Y2 a scheme for sharing the pie. 
Decision stages 
Each period consists of two stages. 
 
q Stage 1: Subject X decides whether to keep for himself either half or one-third of the pie to 
be composed. The remainder will be shared equally between Y1 and Y2. 
 
q Stage 2: Subjects Y1 and Y2 are informed of X’s decision. They then have to decide 
whether to accept or reject this offer. 
v If at least one subject rejects X’s offer, the period is over and the payoff of X, Y1 and 
Y2 is zero for the period. 
v If both Y1 and Y2 accept X’s decision, each of them then has to choose between two 
numbers: 6 or 14. 
This decision takes into account the two following elements: 
- These two individual choices determine the size of the pie to be shared, which 
amounts to the sum of 12 times the number chosen by Y1 and Y2. 
- In choosing the number 6, Y1 or Y2 bears a cost of 9 ECU, which will be deducted 
from his share of the pie. In choosing the number 14, Y1 or Y2 bears a cost of 49 
ECU to be deducted from his share of the pie. 
 
At the end of the period, X, Y1 and Y2 are informed of the numbers chosen by Y1 and Y2 as 
well as of the payoffs net of cost for each of them. 
 
Two examples, from among the range of possibilities, are given below: 
 
1st example: 
X decides to keep half the pie 
Y1 chooses the number 6 
Y2 chooses the number 14 
The pie amount then sums to: 
12 ´ (6 + 14) = 240 
X earns 240 / 2 = 120 
Y1 earns [(120 / 2) - 49] = 51 
Y2 earns [(120 / 2) - 49] = 11 
2nd example: 
X decides to keep one-third of the pie 
Y1 chooses the number 14 
Y2 chooses the number 14 
The pie amount then sums to: 
12 ´ (14 + 14) = 336 
X earns 336 / 3 = 112 
Y1 earns [(336 / 3) - 49] = 63 
Y2 earns [(336 / 3) - 49] = 63 
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More generally, all of the possible decisions yield the following payoffs, net of costs (in ECU): 
 
If X keeps one-third of 
the pie 
ê 
If X keeps half the pie 
ê 
                  Number chosen by Y2                             Number chosen by Y2  
 6 14  6 14 
6 
48 
39 
39 
 80 
 71 
 31 
6  72 
 27 
 27 
120 
 51 
 11 
 
 
Number 
chosen 
by Y1   
14 
80 
31 
71 
112 
 63 
 63 
 
 
Number 
chosen by 
Y1 14 120 
 11 
 51 
168 
 35 
 35 
 
The values in bold represent the numbers chosen by Y1 and Y2. In each cell, you can read 3 
numbers corresponding, respectively, to: 
X's payoff 
Y1's payoff, net of costs 
Y2's payoff, net of costs 
 
At the end of the session, you will be paid in French francs, in accordance with the following set 
of rules: 
 
q 100 ECU = 5 FF 
q Your final payoff is equal to the sum of your payoffs in each of the 20 periods. In addition, 
you will receive a show-up fee of 15 FF. 
q You will be paid in a separate room in order to preserve the confidentiality of your payoff. 
 
If you have any questions regarding these instructions, please raise your hand; your question 
will be answered in private. Throughout the entire session, talking is not allowed. Any violation 
of this rule will result in being excluded from the session and not receiving payment. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix B . Instructions for the asymmetric treatment 
 
You will be participating in an economics experiment in which you can earn money. The 
amount of your earnings will depend not only on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the 
other participants. 
 
This session consists of 20 periods. During each period, a subject X interacts with two subjects 
Y1 and Y2. You will be assigned one of these three roles (either X, Y1 or Y2) at random. You 
will keep the same role and interact with the same two other participants throughout these 20 
periods. You will never be informed of the identity of these participants. 
 
Roles 
q Subjects Y1 and Y2 are, as a team, to compose a pie, which will be shared among the three 
subjects; the amount of this pie is given in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). 
 
q Subject X has to propose to Y1 and Y2 a scheme for sharing the pie. 
Decision stages 
Each period consists of two stages. 
 
q Stage 1: Subject X decides whether to keep for himself either half or one-third of the pie to 
be composed. The remainder will be shared equally between Y1 and Y2. 
 
q Stage 2: Subjects Y1 and Y2 are informed of X’s decision. They then have to decide 
whether to accept or reject this offer. 
v If at least one subject rejects X’s offer, the period is over and the payoff of X, Y1 and 
Y2 is zero for the period. 
v If both Y1 and Y2 accept X’s decision, each of them then has to choose between two 
numbers: 12 or 22. 
This decision takes into account the two following elements: 
- These two individual choices determine the size of the pie to be shared, which 
amounts to the sum of 12 times the number chosen by Y1 and 24 times the number 
chosen by Y2. 
- In choosing the number 12, Y1 or Y2 bears a cost of 36 ECU, which will be 
deducted from his share of the pie. In choosing the number 22, Y1 or Y2 bears a cost 
of 121 ECU to be deducted from his share of the pie. 
 
At the end of the period, X, Y1 and Y2 are informed of the numbers chosen by Y1 and Y2 as 
well as of the payoffs net of cost for each of them. 
 
Two examples, from among the range of possibilities, are given below: 
 
1st example: 
X decides to keep half the pie 
Y1 chooses the number 12 
Y2 chooses the number 22 
The pie amount then sums to: 
(12 ´ 12) + (24 ´ 22) = 672 
X earns 672 / 2 = 336 
Y1 earns [(336 / 2) - 36] = 132 
Y2 earns [(336 / 2) - 121] = 47 
2nd example: 
X decides to keep one-third of the pie 
Y1 chooses the number 22 
Y2 chooses the number 22 
The pie amount then sums to: 
(12 ´ 22) + (24 ´ 22) = 792 
X earns 792 / 3 = 264 
Y1 earns [(792 / 3) - 121] = 143 
Y2 earns [(792 / 3) - 121] = 143 
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More generally, all of the possible decisions yield the following payoffs, net of costs (in ECU): 
 
If X keeps one-third of the pie 
ê 
If X keeps half the pie 
ê 
                               Number chosen by Y2                                   Number chosen by Y2  
 12 22  12 22 
12 144 
108 
108 
224 
188 
103 
12 216 
 72 
 72 
336 
132 
 47 
 
 
Number 
chosen by 
Y1 22 184 
 63 
148 
264 
143 
143 
 
 
Number 
chosen by 
Y1 22 276 
 17 
102 
396 
 77 
 77 
 
The values in bold represent the numbers chosen by Y1 and Y2. In each cell, you can read 3 
numbers corresponding, respectively, to: 
X's payoff 
Y1's payoff, net of costs 
Y2's payoff, net of costs 
 
At the end of the session, you will be paid in French francs, in accordance with the following set 
of rules: 
 
q 100 ECU = 2.5 FF 
q Your final payoff is equal to the sum of your payoffs in each of the 20 periods. In addition, 
you will receive a show-up fee of 15 FF. 
q You will be paid in a separate room in order to preserve the confidentiality of your payoff. 
 
If you have any questions regarding these instructions, please raise your hand; your question 
will be answered in private. Throughout the entire session, talking is not allowed. Any violation 
of this rule will result in being excluded from the session and not receiving payment. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Agents' payoffs in symmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
0.5 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation  
0.33 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation 
Free-riding 
27  
27 
51  
11 
 
Free-riding 
39  
39 
71  
31 Y1 
Cooperation 
11  
51 
35  
35 
 
Y1 
Cooperation 
31  
71 
63  
63 
 
Table 2: Principal's payoffs in symmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
0.5 Contract 
 Free-riding Cooperation  
0.33 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation 
Free-riding 72 120  Free-riding 48 80 
Y1 
Cooperation 120 168  
Y1 
Cooperation 80 112 
 
Table 3: Agents' payoffs in asymmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
0.5 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation  
0.33 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation 
Free-riding 
72  
72 
132  
47 
 
Free-riding 
108  
108 
188  
103 Y1 
Cooperation 
17  
102 
77  
77 
 
Y1 
Cooperation 
63  
148 
143  
143 
 
Table 4: Principal's payoffs in asymmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
0.5 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation  
0.33 Contract 
Free-riding Cooperation 
Free-riding 216 336  Free-riding 144 224 
Y1 
Cooperation 276 396  
Y1 
Cooperation 184 264 
 
 
Table 5: Payoffs according to treatment and strategies 
Symmetric treatment Free-riding with a 0.50 contract Cooperation with a 0.33 contract 
Principal's payoff 
Agent's payoff 
72 
35 
112 
63 
Asymmetric treatment Free-Riding with a 0.50 contract Cooperation with a 0.33 contract 
Principal's payoff 
Agent's payoff 
216 
72 
264 
143 
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Table 6: Summary statistics 
 
 Symmetric Treatment Asymmetric Treatment Total 
Principal's offers (*) 
share = 0.5 
share = 0.33 
 
40 (16.67) 
200 (83.33) 
 
61 (25.20) 
179 (74.80) 
 
101 (21.04) 
379 (78.96) 
Sum 240 240 480 
Acceptance (*) 
share = 0.5 
share = 0.33 
 
15 (37.50) 
198 (99.00) 
 
34 (55.74) 
174 (97.20) 
 
49 (48.51) 
372 (98.15) 
Sum 213 (88.75) 208 (86.66) 421 (87.7) 
Team cooperation (**) 
share = 0.5 
share = 0.33 
 
1 (6.60) 
79 (39.90) 
 
2 (5.89) 
26 (14.94) 
 
3 (6.12) 
105 (28.22) 
Sum 80 (37.56) 28 (13.46) 108 (25.65) 
Team free-riding (**) 
share = 0.5 
share = 0.33 
 
11 (73.40) 
38 (19.20) 
 
24 (70.58) 
90 (51.72) 
 
35 (71.43) 
128 (43.41) 
Sum 49 (23.00) 114 (54.81) 163 (38.72) 
Team partial cooperation (**) 
share = 0.5 
share = 0.33 
 
3 (20.00) 
81 (40.90) 
 
8 (23.53) 
58 (33.34) 
 
11 (22.45) 
139 (37.37) 
Sum 84 (39.44) 66 (31.73) 150 (35.63) 
Note: (*) The percentages in parentheses are based on contracts offered. (**) = The percentages in 
parentheses are based on contracts accepted. 
 
Table 7: Issues played in asymmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
Share: 0.33 
Free-riding Coop.  
Share: 0.50 
Free-riding Coop. 
Free-riding 90 32  Free-riding 24 4 Y1 
Coop. 26 26  
Y1 
Coop. 4 2 
 
Table 8: Issues played in symmetric treatment 
Y2  Y2 
Share: 0.33 
Free-riding Coop.  
Share: 0.50 
Free-riding Coop. 
Free-riding 38 29  Free-riding 11 2 Y1 
Coop. 52 79  
Y1 
Coop. 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 22 -
 
Table 9: Symmetric treatment (N = 228) 
Share Regression 1 Regression 2 
 Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Accept_1 1.37387 0.000 1.48813 0.000 
(Accept_1)(teamfr_1) -0.93244 0.001 -0.89424 0.001 
Round 0.02268 0.270  
Constant -0.08867 0.801  
Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-85.555 
25.00 
-86.288 
59.16 
 
Table 10: Asymmetric treatment (N = 228) 
Share Regression 1 Regression 2 
 Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Accept_1 -0.07143 0.814  
(Accept_1)(teamfr_1) 0.14434 0.529  
Round -0.01062 0.549  
Constant 0.90299 0.018 0.7775 0.055 
 
Wald c2  = 0.68 
prob > c2  = 0.87 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Probability of a 0.33 contract offer 
Behaviour during the previous round 
Probability of 
share = 0.33 Contract rejection Contract acceptance with 
team free-riding 
Contract acceptance 
without team free-riding 
Symmetric treatment 0.50 0.723 0.932 
Asymmetric treatment 0.781 0.781 0.781 
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Table 12: Contract acceptance by the team (N = 480) 
Regression 1 Regression 2  
Team acceptance 
Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Share 2.5164 0.000 2.5109 0.000 
Treatment 0.1213 0.688  
Round 0.0307 0.094 0.0306 0.095 
Constant -0 .5624 0.075 -0.4952 0.062 
Log likelihood of regression 
Wald c2  
-99.5045 
91.60 
-99.5851 
91.08 
 
 
Table 13: Individual acceptance (N = 798) 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
Individual acceptance 
Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| 
Share 1.9372 0.000 2.1850 0.000 
Y_icoop_1 0.0137 0.949  
Round 0.0372 0.035 0.0349 0.001 
Treatment 0.0854 0.727  
Constant 0.1276 0.660  
Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
115.6694 
69.11 
158.8145 
193.99 
 
 
Table 14: The determinants of team cooperation (N = 421) 
Regression 1 Regression 2  
Team cooperation Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| 
Share 0.8380 0.025 0.8421 0.024 
Round -0.0025 0.865  
Treatment -1.253 0.000 -1.2519 0.000 
Constant -1.2744 0.002 -1.3051 0.001 
Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-170.9945 
24.15 
-170.0009 
24.56 
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Table 15: The determinants of team cooperation in each treatment 
  Team coop. 
Asymmetric 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
Team coop. 
Symmetric 
Coeff. P>|z|   Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Share 1.6161 0.006  Share 0.2272 0.658  
Round -0.0413 0.036  Round 0.0498 0.038 0.0481 0.042 
Constant -1.6446 0.008  Constant -2.4613 0.000 -2.2706 0.000 
Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-96.9043 
11.62 
 Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-67.065 
4.33 
-67.1636 
4.15 
(N = 213)    (N = 208) 
 
Table 16: Individual cooperation between types of treatment 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 
Symmetric 
Coeff. P>|z|  
Asymmetric 
Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Share 1.2423 0.000  Share 0.2897 0.230  
Y_icoop_1 0.2748 0.095  Y_icoop_1 0.7151 0.000 0.6999 0.000 
Round -0.0349 0.011  Round 0.0045 0.749  
Constant -0.7851 0.029  Constant -1.1447 0.000 -0.8492 0.000 
Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-211.2617 
25.11 
 Log likelihood 
Wald c2  
-183.8326 
17.58 
-184.6053 
16.01 
(N = 374)    (N = 350) 
 
Table 17: Individual incentive to free-ride in asymmetric treatment 
 Agent Y1  Agent Y2  
Share = 0.33 31.46 3.50 
Share = 0.50 71.40 32.47 
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Table 18: Difference in agents' behaviour in asymmetric treatment (N = 350) 
Agent coop Share Dummy*share Y_i coop_1 Dummy*Y_ icoop_1 Round Dummy Const. 
Coeff. 
P>|z| 
0.4615 
0.155 
-0.3373 
0.426 
0.7814 
0.001 
-0.0897 
0.783 
0.0045 
0.748 
0.1146 
0.777 
-1.2145 
0.001 
 
 
Table 19: Rates of team cooperation and 0.33 contract offers 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Asymmetric 
% team coop. 
% of 0.33 offers 
 
0.10 
0.75 
 
0.20 
0.75 
 
0.11 
0.58 
 
0.08 
0.92 
 
0.10 
0.66 
 
0.17 
0.83 
 
0.20 
0.66 
 
0.44 
0.58 
 
0.36 
0.66 
 
0.27 
0.75 
 
0.09 
0.58 
Symmetric 
% team coop. 
% of 0.33 offers 
 
0.50 
0.83 
 
0.54 
0.92 
 
0.30 
0.75 
 
0.40 
0.75 
 
0.44 
0.66 
 
0.27 
0.92 
 
0.27 
0.92 
 
0.36 
0.92 
 
0.27 
0.83 
 
0.50 
1.00 
 
0.27 
0.75 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Team behaviour as a function of treatment 
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Figure 2: Rejection rates as a function of contracts 
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Figure 3: Evolution of acceptance probability over time 
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Figure 4: Probability of team cooperation over time in symmetric treatment 
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Figure 5: Probability of team cooperation over time in asymmetric treatment 
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